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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
JAMES E. WISE,
Appellant,

-vJOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utah State
Prison,
Respondent.

Case No.
11051

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, James E. Wise, appeals from an
order dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
By order dated September 29, 1967, the trial
court, Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, Judge, dismissed appellant's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the trial court's order
dismissing appellant's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 9, 1963, in the Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr., presiding, appellant was convicted on trial by jury under Utah Code Ann. § 76-20-11 (1953) of the crime of
issuing a check against insufficient funds and was
committed to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term provided by law.
At the hearing on appellant's complaint and
petition for a writ of habeas corpus held on September 5th and 18th, 1967, Honorable Joseph G.
Jeppson presiding, appellant testified that two days
before his trial was to be held, on October 7, 1963,
he received by mail service of notice of withdrawal
of counsel from his attorney, Mr. James F. Housley
(T. 12). Immediately thereafter, according to his testimony, appellant went to the chambers of Judge Ray
Van Cott, Jr., and requested of that judge a continuance of his trial so that he might retain other
counsel. According to the testimony of appellant,
that request was denied (T. 13). According to his testimony, appellant then said: "Well, may I at least defend myself so that there \A.till be some sort of defense?" Judge Van Cott replied, no, that he would
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refuse to let Mr. Housley withdraw (T. 14). It was
not shown that there was a reporter present, and if
this conversation did indeed take place it was not
made part of the record. The only evidence to the
fact that it did take place, or to the substance of it,
came from the testimony of appellant (T. 13) and a
woman companion, Mrs. Greta Butterfield, appellant's girl friend (T. 28).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FACTS HERE PRESENTED DO NOT
REVEAL A SUBSTANTIAL DENIAL OF DUE
PROCESS AND ARE DISTINGUISHABLE
FROM THIS COURT'S HOLDING THAT A
FAILURE TO PERMIT A DEFENDANT TO
REPRESENT HIMSELF CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.

In the hearing on appellant's petition for habeas
corpus, and in this appeal appellant relies heavily
on this court's opinion in State v. Penderville, 2 Utah
2d 281, 272 P.2d 195 (1954), where it was held that
refusal to allow a defendant to represent himself
constituted reversible error. That case is distinguishable from the present case on appeal both factually
and in its rationale.
In State v. Penderville. supra. the defendant, by
letter to the trial court on the day before the trial,
complained of the service being rendered him by
his attorney and requested a postponement to enable him to procure other counsel. The court had
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Penderville brought before it where he repeated his
request for a postponement in the presence of a reporter. the conversation being made a part of the
record. The request for postponement was denied.
This court held this denial was not error as there
had been no showing that the attorney was unfaithful, incompetent, or unprepared for trial. Penderville
then asked to defend himself rather than proceed
with counsel in whom he had lost confidence. This
was denied, and trial was held with representation
by the original counsel. This court held, granting
a new trial: "The right to defend in person certainly should not be denied an accused in a situation
where he must either choose to use it or proceed
with counsel in whom he has lost confidence." (2
Utah 2d at 288).
In the present case, appellant was represented
by Mr. Housley at the preliminary hearing and
made no attempt to discharge him at that time (T. 16),
or in the intervening four to six weeks (T. 25), between the time of the preliminary hearing and the
date at which Mr. Housley attempted to withdraw
as counsel. He had made no move to discharge Mr.
Housley when, two days before trial, he received
the notice of withdrawal. Respondent submits this
supports a fair inference that appellant fully intended to go to trial with Mr. Housley representing him
and had confidence in that attorney's ability to provide him an adequate defense.
Therefore. the trial court's refusal to allow Mr.
Housley to withdraw would work no prejudice to
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appellant under the rationale of State v. Penderville,
supra. As in Penderville. appellant initiated the attempt to change counsel and had expressed a reluctance to go to trial with his original counsel, saying that he would rather defend himself than be
represented by that attorney. Respondent submits
that appellant's testimony as to what he said in the
conversation with Judge Van Cott supports a fair inference that his primary concern was not defending
himself but in insuring" ... some sort of defense ... "
(T. 14). and that he obviously felt, as witnessed by
that statement, that Mr. Housley's withdrawal and
Judge Van Cott's refusal to grant a continuance
would force him to trial without a defense. The subsequent refusal by Judge Van Cott to allow Mr.
Housley' s withdrawal would seem to have alleviated
that fear, and respondent suggests that knowledge
of the Penderville holding may account for the emphasis in the appellant's account of the conversation
with Judge Van Cott on his purported desire to defend himself.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR A
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BY HOLDING AS
A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE COMPLAINT
APPELLANT ATTEMPTED TO RAISE WAS
NOT REACHABLE BY A WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS, BEING OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF
THAT WRIT.

In Thompson v. Harris, 107 Utah 99, 152 P.2d 91
(1944), this court, on rehearing, held that the scope
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of habeas corpus was limited to the correction of
jurisdictional errors and the determination of whether or not a petitioner had been deprived of constitutional rights, and that with the exception of these
two areas, errors of the trial court must be corrected
by appeal.
Appellant makes no contention that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction, therefore, his petition must
demonstrate denial of constitutional rights to come
within the scope of the writ. This court in Bryant v.
Turner, 20 Utah 2d 284, 4~1 P.2d 121 (1967) defined
the function of the extraordinary writ of habeas
corpus in stating:
We do not mean to sav that the time honored writ
of habeas corpus does' not have a very important
and useful purpose in our law. But that purpose is
not to review a final judgment arrived at through
regular proceedings and due process of law by a
court having jurisdiction. The writ is, as our rules
describe it, an extraordinary writ, to be used to protect one who is restrained of his liberty where there
exists no jurisdiction or authority, or where the
requirements of the law have been so ignored or
distorted that the party is substantially and effectively denied what is included in the term due process of law, or where some other such circumstance
exists that it would be wholly unconscionable not to
re-examine the conviction. (431 P.2d at 122, 123)

The burden of showing error or prejudice is
on the appellant who seeks to upset the conviction.
State v. Hamilton, 18 Utah 2d 234, 419 P.2d 770 (1966),
and he must show such grounds by evidence that
is clear and convincing. McGuffey v. Turner, 18
Utah 2d 354 423 P.~d 166 (l 967). Appellant made no
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contention that any prejudice resulted to him. The
fact that no prejudice resulted from an alleged denial of constitutional rights has been held to justify
dismissal or denial of habeas corpus petitions based
on alleged denials of constitutional rights. Gallegos
v. Cox. 341 F.2d 107 (10th Cir. 1965); Armstrong v.
Bannan. 272 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1959); Carson v. Haskins. 2 Ohio 2d 324, '.?.08 N.W.2d 742 (1965).
Appellant makes no claim that he was not represented adequately. The attorney who defended
him was prepared for trial (T. 24). Respondent submits that it cannct be said that appellant was substantially or effectively denied due process of law
or that any prejudice resulted to him.
It has been stated:
If the trial court had jurisdiction, it is only in extraordinary cases, where the circumstances surrounding the trial make it a sham and a pretense, that
the writ will lie on the ground for want of due process of law even though it be alleged that the accused
has been denied rights guaranted by the Constitution.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 92 F.2d. 748 (C.C.A. Ga.
1937), cert. granted 303 U.S. 629, 58 Sup.Ct. 610,
82 L.Ed. 1089, rev. on other grounds 304 U.S. 458,
58 Sup. Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461; See also, State
ex rel Dunlap v. Utecht, 206 Minn. 41, 287 N.W.
229 (1939).

The respondent submits that the writ is discretionary and that unless it appears that the judge below clearly abused his discretion, that decision
should not be overturned. State v. Crank. et al. 105
Utah 322, 142 P.2d 178 (1943).
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CONCLUSION

Appellant's reliance on the Penderville case fails
to take into account the factual distinctions between
that decision and the instant case. The trial judge
here correctly required counsel to proceed to trial
in the matter. To do otherwise would have been to
give substance to appellant's self-expressed fear of
his inability to defend himself.
Further, this case represents another attempt
by an appellant to take a belated appeal. The court
below correctly found the issue presented not justiciable through habeas corpus.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN

Attorney General
GERALD G. GUNDRY
Assistant Attorney General
State of Utah
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent

